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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JOSEPH MITCHELL PARSONS,

)
)

Plaintiff/Appellant,

)

PETITION FOR REHEARING

)

vs.

)
)

M. ELDON BARNES,
Defendant/Appellee.

)
)
)

Case No. 920126
Priority No. 1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
The basic issue presented is whether the Court's determination that the remedy for the
error committed at trial in the double counting of aggravating circumstances should only be
applied prospectively. A related issue is whether the Court correctly determined that Parsons
was not prejudiced by the error committed at trial.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
For purposes of this petition, this Court's statement of the case is generally sufficient:
Plaintiff Joseph Mitchell Parsons ["Parsons"] appeals from the denial of
his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
On August 30, 1987, Parsons was hitchhiking near Barstow, California,
when the victim, Richard L. Ernest, offered him a ride to Denver, Colorado.
Parsons accepted. At 3:30 the next morning, the two men stopped to sleep at the
Lunt Park rest area on Interstate Highway 15 near Cedar City, Utah. Both men
were settling into sleep when, according to Parsons. Ernest made two sexual
advances. The men struggled, and Parsons stabbed Ernest in the chest several
times with a five-inch double-edged knife.

Parsons drove about a mile from the rest area and pushed Ernest's body
onto the shoulder of the highway He then drove to a service station/convenience
store in Beaver, Utah, where he changed his clothes, cleaned out the car and
discarded Ernest's personal belongings in a trash dumpster Using the victim's
credit card, he purchased gas and food From Beaver, he drove to Richfield,
Utah, where he again used Ernest's credit card to purchase several items and to
get a motel room Later that day, police officers were alerted to Parsons' unusual
activities at the convenience store and to his fraudulent credit card purchases At
4 15 p m , officers found him sleeping in Ernest's car at a rest area near Salina,
Utah, and arrested him The next morning police otticers discovered the
victim's body
On September 2, the Iron County prosecutor tiled an information charging
Parsons with first degree murder and aggravated robbery The same day, the
prosecutor took the statements of two witnesses under oath at his office, one from
Beverly Ernest, the victim's widow, and one from Chad Williams, an employee
at the Beaver convenience store
The fifth district court began a preliminary hearing on September 17 but
discontinued the proceeding at the request of Parsons' appointed counsel The
next day, on the advice of counsel, Parsons pleaded guilty to first degree murder
in violation of Utah Code Ann § 76-5-202 l Specifically, he pleaded to the
offense as defined in section 76-5-202(1 )(h) (intentionally or knowingly causing
the death of another having been previously convicted of a felony involving the
use or threat of violence to another person) In addition Parsons pleaded guilty
to aggravated robbery and theft of an operable motor vehicle The sentencing
jury imposed the death sentence We affirmed the sentence on direct appeal
State v Parsons, 781 P 2d 1275 (Utah 1989)
On March 8, 1990, Parsons filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus
review of the third district court Approximately seven months later, his new
appointed counsel filed an amended petition asserting several instances of
ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal The petition also raised
a constitutional issue independent of the ineffective assistance allegations

1

Following this verdict, the statute was amended in 1991, deleting the first degree murder
classification and making the crime "aggravated murder " Utah Code Ann § 76-5-202 (Supp
1993)
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Parsons contended that by taking the sworn statements of witnesses without giving
notice to the defense, the prosecutor violated his federal constitutional rights to
counsel and to confront the witnesses against him, U.S. Const, amend. VI, as
well as his federal and state constitutional rights to due process. U.S. Const,
amend. XIV; Utah Const, art. I, § 7.
Following an evidentiary hearing, the third district court denied the writ,
holding that Parsons had received effective assistance of counsel. The court
addressed the constitutional question solely as an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claim, not as a substantive constitutional error. The court denied compensation
for appointed counsel in the habeas proceeding, holding that it was a matter for
legislative rather than judicial resolution. Parsons appeals.
Parsons v. Barnes, No. 920126, slip. op. at 1-2 (Utah Jan. 11, 1994) (a copy of the full opinion
is attached to this petition as Addendum I). On appeal, the Court affirmed the court below.
Ibid. Parsons was given additional fourteen (14) days to file the instant petition. See Addendum
II (Motion and Order for Additional Time to File Petition for Rehearing).

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The facts pertinent to this petition are set forth in the Statement of Case, above, or in the
argument portion of this brief.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court should have ordered the parties to brief the question whether the error of
double counting aggravating circumstances committed at trial in this case should be applied
prospectively.

Additionally, the Court should have applied the harmless constitutional error

standard in resolving whether Parsons was prejudiced by the trial error.
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INTRODUCTION
A petition for rehearing is appropriate when the Court has misinterpreted or overlooked
the relevant law. See Cummins v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 172-73, 129 P. 619, 624 (1913). The
argument portion of this brief will demonstrate that Parsons' petition is properly before the Court
and should be granted.

ARGUMENT
One of the issues raised by Parsons on appeal concerned the double counting of
aggravating circumstances. The Court dealt with the issue in its written opinion at pages 16-20.
The Court found that Parsons' claim of double counting should have been raised by trial counsel
and, "in failing to object to the special verdict form . . . counsel's performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness." Parsons, slip op., at 18.
The Court went on to state that "in the future, jury instructions or special verdict forms
which contain either of the two murder-robbery factors in Section 76-5-202(1 )(d) should not
contain the pecuniary gain factor as well. Otherwise, the defendant is essentially condemned
'twice for the same culpable act.'" Parsons, slip op., at 19 (cited case omitted). The Court
concluded, however:
In deciding whether Parsons was prejudiced, we must conclude that the jury did
as it was instructed to do. No defendant is entitled "to the luck of a lawless
decision maker." . . . Therefore, our assessment of prejudice proceeds "on the
assumption that the decision maker is reasonably conscientiously and impartially
applying the standards that govern the decision."

- 4-

Parsons, slip op., at 20 (citations omitted).
The Court's conclusion above undercuts the requirements of the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, Article 1, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution, and cases interpreting
those provisions. The Strickland1 prejudice test applied by the Court in this case is, in essence,
a harmless error analysis, because the Court had earlier found that counsel's performance was
deficient under the Sixth Amendment. See Parsons, slip, op., at 18. See generally Delaware
v. ArsdaH, 475 U.S. 673, 678-84 (1986) (discussing harmlessness of errors of constitutional
magnitude). Consequently, because there was an error of constitutional magnitude, this Court
should have called on the parties to brief its harmlessness and, more specifically, should have
imposed on the State the burden of proving harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt. See
Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 678-84; Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
In addition, the Court's conclusion on the prejudice to Parsons contravenes Article 1,
Section 11 of the Utah Constitution, mandating that "[a]ll courts shall be open, and every
person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have a remedy by
due course of law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay. . . . " Utah
Const, art. 1, § 11.
In the instant case, the Court did not ask counsel, nor was counsel given a full
opportunity to brief and argue the issue of appropriate remedy for the error committed by the

2

See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
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trial court and/or counsel. The question regarding the appropriate remedy and whether it should
be prospectively applied is one that has not been briefed. Parsons moves this Court to allow the
parties to brief the issue, so that Parsons can receive proper remedy at law under Article I,
Section 11, as well as the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing argument, the Court should grant and modify its opinion to
conform to Utah law or, at least, order the parties to brief this particular issue. Utah R. App.
P. 35(c).
Counsel certifies that this petition is presented in good faith and not for delay.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of February, 1994.

RONALD J. YENGICH, #3580
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
175 East 400 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-0320

GREGORY J. SANDERS, #2858
KIPP & CHRISTIAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
175 East 400 South, Suite 330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3773
-6-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby declare that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Petition for
Rehearing, postage prepaid, this

day of February, 1994, to Kris Leonard, Assistant

Attorney General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114.
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ADDENDUM I

SLIP OPTNTON
PARSONS v. BARNES

77i£5 opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
00O00

Joseph Mitchell Parsons,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
M. Eldon Barnes, in his
capacity as Warden of the
Utah State Prison,
Defendant and Appellee.

No. 920126
FILED
January 11, 1994

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable David S. Young
Attorneys:

Ronald J. Yengich, Gregory J. Sanders, Kirk Gibbs,
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff
R. Paul Van Dam, Att'y Gen., Kris Leonard, Asst.
Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for defendant

HOWE, Justice;
Plaintiff Joseph Mitchell Parsons appeals from the
denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
On August 30, 1987, Parsons was hitchhiking near
Barstow, California, when the victim, Richard L. Ernest, offered
him a ride to Denver, Colorado. Parsons accepted. At 3:00 the
next morning, the two men stopped to sleep at the Lunt Park rest
area on Interstate Highway 15 near Cedar City, Utah. Both men
were settling into sleep when, according to Parsons, Ernest made
two sexual advances.
The men struggled, and Parsons
stabbed
Ernest in the chest several times with a five-inch double-edged
knife.
Parsons drove about a mile from the rest area and
pushed Ernest's body onto the shoulder of the highway. He then
drove to a service station/convenience store in Beaver, Utah,
where he changed his clothes, cleaned out the car, and discarded
Ernest's personal belongings in a trash dumpster. Using the
victim's credit card, he purchased gas and food. From Beaver, he
drove to Richfield, Utah, where he again used Ernest's credit
card to purchase several items and to get a motel room. Later
that day, police officers were alerted to Parsons' unusual

activities at the convenience store and to his fraudulent credit
card purchases. At 4:15 p.m., officers found him sleeping in
Ernest's car at a rest area near Salina, Utah, and arrested him.
The next morning, police officers discovered the victim's body.
On September 2, the Iron County prosecutor filed an
information charging Parsons with first degree murder and
aggravated robbery. The same day, the prosecutor took the
statements of two witnesses under oath at his office, one from
Beverly Ernest, the victim's widow, and one from Chad Williams,
an employee at the Beaver convenience store.
The fifth district court began a preliminary hearing on
September 17 but discontinued the proceeding at the request of
Parsons' appointed counsel. The next day, on the advice of
counsel, Parsons pleaded guilty to first degree murder in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202. 1 Specifically, he
pleaded to the offense as defined in section 76-5-202(1)(h)
(intentionally or knowingly causing the death of another having
been previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat
of violence to another person). In addition, Parsons pleaded
guilty to aggravated robbery and theft of an operable motor
vehicle. The sentencing jury imposed the death sentence. We
affirmed the sentence on direct appeal. State v. Parsons, 781
P.2d 1275 (Utah 1989).
On March 8, 1990, Parsons filed a pro se petition for
habeas corpus review in the third district court. Approximately
seven months later, his new appointed counsel filed an amended
petition asserting several instances of ineffective assistance of
counsel at trial and on appeal. The petition also raised a
constitutional issue independent of the ineffective assistance
allegations. Parsons contended that by taking the sworn
statements of witnesses without giving notice to the defense, the
prosecutor violated his federal constitutional rights to counsel
and to confront the witnesses against him, U.S. Const, amend. VI,
as well as his federal and state constitutional rights to due
process. U.S. Const, amend. XIV; Utah Const, art. I, § 7.
Following an evidentiary hearing, the third district
court denied the writ, holding that Parsons had received
effective assistance of counsel. The court addressed the
constitutional question solely as an ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel claim, not as a substantive constitutional error. The
court denied compensation for appointed counsel in the habeas
proceeding, holding that it was a matter for legislative rather
than judicial resolution. Parsons appeals.
1

Following this verdict, the statute was amended in 1991,
deleting the first degree murder classification and making the
crime "aggravated murder." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (Supp.
1993) .
No. 920126
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
In deciding habeas appeals, we review conclusions of
law for correctness, according "no deference to the lower court's
conclusions." Gerrish v. Barnes, 844 P.2d 315, 318-19 (Utah
1992) (citing Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547, 549 (Utah 1989)).
However, "the trial court's factual findings shall not be set
aside on appeal unless clearly erroneous." State v. Tyler, 850
P.2d 1250, 1253 (Utah 1993).
Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claims present a mixed question of law and fact. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698, reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267
(1984); State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990).
DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS, RIGHT TO COUNSEL,
AND RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES
As explained, on the same day he charged Parsons with
first degree murder, the prosecutor took the statements of
Williams and Mrs. Ernest under oath. Parsons now argues that by
taking these sworn statements without giving notice to the
defense, the prosecutor violated his federal constitutional right
to counsel and to confront the witnesses against him, U.S. Const,
amend. VI, and his federal and state constitutional rights to due
process. U.S. Const, amend. XIV; Utah Const, art. I, § 7.
Parsons raises this argument independent of his ineffective
assistance allegations.
Habeas relief is available where a defendant has
suffered an "obvious injustice" or "substantial and prejudicial
denial of a constitutional right." Gerrish v. Barnes, 844 P.2d
at 319; Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1034 (Utah 1989). However,
the writ can neither substitute for, nor perform the function of,
regular appellate review. Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101,
1104 (Utah 1983); see, e.g.f Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1034
(Utah 1989); Bundy v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 803, 804 (Utah 1988);
Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 98-99, 440 P.2d 968, 969 (1968).
For this reason, a "party may not raise issues in a habeas corpus
petition that could or should have been raised on direct appeal."
Fernandez, 783 P.2d at 549. However, where "unusual
circumstances are present that justify the failure to raise the
issue on direct appeal, a court may entertain such a claim raised
for the first time in the habeas corpus petition." Id.
The State argues that Parsons' substantive
constitutional arguments are procedurally barred because he
failed to raise them on direct appeal and because he has not
shown "unusual circumstances" justifying his failure to do so.
While it is true that he has not alleged the requisite unusual
circumstances, "procedural default is not always determinative of
a collateral attack on a conviction" where, as in this case, "it
is alleged that the trial was not conducted within the bounds of
basic fairness or in harmony with constitutional standards."
Hurst, 777 P.2d at 103 6. We therefore reach the merits of
3

No. 920126

Parsons' federal constitutional arguments. However, after
careful consideration, we conclude that his Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights were not violated.2
Rule 14(h) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
exclusively governs the taking of depositions in criminal
cases.3 See State v. Nielsen, 522 P.2d 1366, 1367 (Utah 1974)
(holding that rule 30 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
permitting discovery depositions, does not apply to criminal
cases). It permits depositions in narrow circumstances:

1

We do not address Parsons7 due process claim under
article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution because he has
nominally relied on the Utah Constitution while actually relying
on the parallel federal provision in the Fourteenth Amendment.
We reaffirm our statement in State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239,
1247 n.5 (Utah 1988), vacated on other grounds, Laffertv v. Cook,
949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991), that "[a]s a general rule, we
will not engage in state constitutional analysis unless an
argument for different analyses under the state and federal
constitutions is briefed." Parsons has not briefed his state due
process claim, and we will not "engage in constructing arguments
out of whole cloth" on his behalf. Id.
3

Section 77-22-2 of the Utah Code permits county attorneys
to subpoena witnesses and to "compel their attendance and
testimony under oath." Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-2(2)(a) (Supp.
1993). The county attorney may exercise this power only in
conjunction with a criminal investigation with "approval of the
district court and for good cause shown." Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-22-2(1)(a) (Supp. 1993). A county prosecutor proceeds under
section 77-22-2 prior to commencing prosecution of a defendant or
defendants. KUTV Inc. v. Conder, 635 P.2d 412, 414 (Utah 1981).
The legislature's purpose in granting subpoena powers to
prosecutors is "to provide a method of keeping information gained
from investigations secret both to protect the innocent and to
prevent criminal suspects from having access to information prior
to prosecution." Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-1. For this reason, the
statute does not require the prosecutor to give notice of the
proceedings to persons being investigated, nor does it require
such persons and their counsel to be present during the
proceedings. Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-2(3)-(4) .
The sworn statements at issue are not those contemplated by
section 77-22-2. The prosecutor testified that in taking the
sworn statements, he was not proceeding pursuant to any
investigative subpoena power. In addition, he took the
statements of Williams and Mrs. Ernest after charges had been
filed against Parsons. Because there was no need to keep
investigatory information secret, the prosecutor immediately gave
both statements to defense counsel.
No. 920126
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(h) Whenever a material witness is
about to leave the state, or is so ill or
infirm as to afford reasonable grounds for
believing that he will be unable to attend a
trial or hearing, either party may, upon
notice to the other, apply to the court for
an order that the witness be examined
conditionally by deposition. Attendance of
the witness at the deposition may be
compelled by subpoena. The defendant shall
be present at the deposition and the court
shall make whatever order is necessary to
effect such attendance.
Utah R. Crim. P. 14.
When a prosecutor takes a statement that does not
conform to the requirements of rule 14(h), he or she has not
taken a deposition even if the witness gives the statement under
oath. Admittedly, the term "deposition" is sometimes "used in a
broad sense to describe any written statement verified by oath."
23 Am. Jur. 2d Depositions and Discovery § 108 (1983).4
However, according to rule 14(h), a statement under oath is not a
deposition unless the court has ordered the proceeding, the
deposing party has given notice to the other party, the defendant
is present, and the witness being deposed is about to leave the
state or is so ill that his or her attending the trial is
unlikely. At the habeas proceeding, the prosecutor testified
that he was not proceeding under rule 14(h) when he took the
statements of Williams and Mrs. Ernest. Rather, he took the
statements "to preserve and gain information" and "to put
everything in perspective—times, dates, who did what." He did
not apply to the court for an order to take the statements, nor
did he notify Parsons. Accordingly, we agree with the trial
court that the statements of Williams and Mrs. Ernest "were not
x
depositions', but were rather xsworn statements' generated by a
careful and thoughtful investigative prosecutor." While no
statutory or procedural rule affirmatively authorizes a
prosecutor to take investigatory statements outside the confines
of rule 14(h), due process of law is not offended when a
prosecutor chooses to do so.
In fact, the record indicates that Parsons benefited
from the statements. The habeas court found it likely that the
prosecutor took the statements before defense counsel was
appointed, thereby preserving information for Parsons when it was
fresh in the minds of two critical witnesses. Likewise, defense
counsel used Mrs. Ernest/s sworn statement at the sentencing
4

It appears that the prosecutor was using "deposition" in
this broad sense when he informed Williams and Mrs. Ernest that
he was going to take their deposition.
5
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hearing for impeachment purposes. Parsons enjoyed the benefits
of the sworn statements at trial without objection but now argues
that taking the statements violated his right to due process.
This inconsistency smacks of invited error, which is
"procedurally unjustified and vip.wgri wS-hh rH^f^vYvr." State v,
Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 560-61 (Utah 1987); see, e.g.. State v.
Smith, 776 P.2d 929, 932 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("A defendant
cannot lead the court into error by failing to object and then
later, when he is displeased with the verdict, profit by his
actions.M).
Parsons' Sixth Amendment claims must also fail. The
"primary object of the constitutional right of confrontation is
to prevent depositions and ex parte affidavits from being used
against the accused at trial in lieu of personal examination and
cross-examination of the witness against him." State v.
Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 785 (Utah 1980). The statements in
question were not used in place of personal examination. Both
Williams and Mrs. Ernest testified at the sentencing hearing, and
Parsons had full opportunity to confront them at that time.
Parsons argues that the threat of perjury prosecution
may have prevented Williams and Mrs. Ernest from deviating from
their sworn statements when subjected to cross-examination at the
sentencing hearing. He contends that this chilling of truthful
testimony would not have occurred if the prosecutor had not
placed Williams and Mrs. Ernest under oath when he took their
statements. We are not persuaded. Parsons' argument presumes
that Williams and Mrs. Ernest gave false statements to the
prosecutor and that neither the oath nor the threat of perjury
prosecution deterred them from doing so. The more probable
presumption is that the oath had its intended effect. The
purpose of the oath is to "ensure that the affiant consciously
recognizes his or her legal obligation to tell the truth." 58
Am. Jur. 2d Oath and Affirmation § 6 (1989). It is regarded as
the "highest test of truth" and is the "instrument appropriated
by the law for the ascertainment of the truth in judicial
investigations." Id. Thus, the oath and its attendant penalties
for false swearing are the best assurance that the investigatory
statements of Williams and Mrs. Ernest were true.5 By taking
the statements under oath, the prosecutor did not chill truthful
testimony at the sentencing hearing. Rather, he ensured that the
testimony of both witnesses would comport with their prior
truthful statements.

5

Section 78-24-17 of the Utah Code sets out the form of the
oath as follows: "You do solemnly swear (or affirm) that the
evidence you shall give in this issue (or matter) pending between
and
shall be the truth,
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God (or,
under the pains and penalties of perjury)."
No. 920126
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Furthermore, Parsons' claims are at best speculative.
He has not shown that Williams or Mrs. Ernest would have
testified differently at the sentencing hearing had their initial
sworn statements not been taken under oath* Therefore, we must
conclude that any benefit Parsons might have gained by having
counsel present when the prosecutor took the statements could
also have been realized during cross-examination at the
sentencing hearing. For these reasons, we hold that the taking
of investigatory statements under oath by the prosecution without
notice to the defense did not violate Parsons' federal rights to
counsel, to confront witnesses, or to due process. U.S. Const,
amends. VI, XIV.
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
As explained above, absent the existence of unusual
circumstances, a "party may not raise issues in a habeas corpus
petition that could or should have been raised on direct appeal."
Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547, 549 (Utah 1989). We have held
that unusual circumstances exist when trial counsel represented
the defendant on direct appeal and the defendant in a subsequent
habeas proceeding contends that he had ineffective assistance of
counsel at trial, on appeal, or both. Id. at 549-50. The reason
for this rule is that trial counsel cannot reasonably be expected
to raise the issue of his or her own incompetence on appeal.
Because the same attorney represented Parsons both at trial and
on direct appeal, Parsons' claims of ineffective assistance are
properly before us.
Parsons argued thirteen counts of ineffective
assistance of counsel in the habeas court, eight of which he
raises on this appeal. Specifically, he contends that his
counsel (1) failed to object to and raise on appeal the
prosecutor's taking of sworn statements without notice to the
defense, (2) failed to conduct adequate pretrial investigation,
(3) failed to object to or raise on appeal the prosecutor's
refusal to consent to waiving the preliminary hearing, advising
Parsons instead to plead guilty without obtaining any meaningful
benefit in return, (4) failed to adequately explore contact
between a juror and a prosecution witness, (5) failed to file a
formal discovery motion, (6) failed to spend adequate time with
Parsons in preparation, (7) failed to conduct adequate voir dire,
and (8) failed to object to the special verdict form. Parsons
points to these same allegations as evidence of cumulative error.
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984),
the United States Supreme Court established a two-part test for
determining when a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel has been violated. We have adopted that
test as follows:
To prevail, a defendant must show, first,
that his counsel rendered a deficient
7
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performance in some demonstrable manner,
which performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonable professional judgment
and, second, that counsel,s performance
prejudiced the defendant.
Bundy v. DeLandf 763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988); see, e.g.. State
v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 186-87 (Utah 1990); State v. Carter,
776 P.2d 886, 893 (Utah 1989); State v. Frame. 723 P.2d 401, 405
(Utah 1986).
In assessing counsel's performance under the first
component of the test, we recognize fl>the variety of
circumstances faced by defense counsel [and] the range of
legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal
defendant.'" Templin, 805 P.2d at 186 (quoting Strickland, 466
U.S. at 689). For this reason, a defendant must "overcome the
strong presumption that trial counsel rendered adequate
assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment.11
State v. Bullock. 791 P.2d 155, 159-60 (Utah), cert, denied, 110
S. Ct. 3270 (1989).
To show prejudice under the second component of the
test, a defendant must proffer sufficient evidence to support "a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Templin. 805 P.2d at 187; Carter.
776 P.2d at 894 n.30. When a defendant challenges a death
sentence, "the question is whether there is a reasonable
probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer . . . would
have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances did not warrant death." Strickland, 466 U.S. at
695. Reasonable probability means a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the reliability of the sentence. Id.;
Frame, 723 P.2d at 405.
Parsons urges us to "abandon the second prong of the
Strickland test." He argues that showing counsel's
professionally unreasonable conduct ought to be sufficient to
establish a violation of the right to effective assistance of
counsel. Surprisingly, he relies on our decision in Templin, 805
P.2d at 186, where we specifically held that a "defendant has the
burden of meeting both parts of [the Strickland] test."
We will not abandon one part of the Supreme Court's
two-part analysis. The requirement that a defendant
affirmatively prove prejudice is grounded in the very purpose of
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel—"to ensure that a defendant
has the assistance necessary to justify reliance on the outcome
of the proceeding." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-92. As the
Supreme Court recently explained:
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"[T]he right to the effective assistance of
counsel is recognized not for its own sake,
but because of the effect it has on the
ability of the accused to receive a fair
trial. Absent some effect of challenged
conduct on the reliability of the trial
process, the Sixth Amendment guaranty is
generally not implicated."
Lockhart v, Fretwell. 122 L. Ed. 2d 180, 188-89 (1993) (que* ^ng
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984)). Unless >
defendant shows both deficient conduct of counsel and prejudice,
"it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted
from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result
unreliable." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (emphasis added).
Absent the prejudice requirement, a defendant could
show ineffective assistance merely by demonstrating that
counsel's errors fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. Attorney errors would be categorized according
to likelihood of prejudice rather than actual effect on the
proceeding itself. This would provide a windfall to many
defendants because errors of counsel "come in an infinite variety
and are as likely to be utterly harmless in a particular case as
they are to be prejudicial." Id. at 693. Legal representation
that is "unprofessional in one case may be sound or even
brilliant in another." Id. The "prejudice" component of the
Strickland test prevents this potential windfall by insisting on
a nexus between the deficient performance of counsel and the
reliability of the verdict or sentence.
For these reasons, we have consistently required
defendants claiming ineffective assistance of counsel to
affirmatively prove both prongs of the Strickland test to
prevail, Fernandez v. Cook,
P.2d
,
(Utah 1993);
State v. Tvler, 850 P.2d 1250, 1253-54 (Utah 1993); Tempiin. 805
P.2d at 186-87; Bullock, 791 P.2d at 159; Carter. 776 P.2d at
893; State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 118 n.2 (Utah 1989); Bundv,
763 P.2d at 805; State v. Lovell, 758 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 1988);
Frame, 723 P.2d at 405, and we will continue to do so.
As an alternative to abandoning the prejudice
requirement of the Strickland analysis, Parsons urges us to
"limit its application" to circumstances under which a defendant
"might reasonably be expected" to meet the requirement. In his
view, this limitation is necessary because incarcerated, indigent
defendants do not have the resources necessary to show that
absent counsel's errors the result of their trial or sentencing
hearing would have been different. Parsons also contends that
some issues simply do not lend themselves to a showing of
prejudice. While we recognize that the Strickland test imposes a
"difficult burden" on defendants, Tylerf 850 P.2d at 1259, we
cannot adopt his proposed limitations.
9
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In effect, Parsons is requesting that prejudice be
presumed because of his indigent status. In Strickland, the
Supreme Court recognized that "in certain Sixth Amendment
contexts, prejudice is presumed." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692.
These circumstances include the "[a]ctual or constructive denial
of the assistance of counsel altogether/1 as well as "various
kinds of state interference with counsel's assistance." Id.
Prejudice may also be presumed where counsel had a conflict of
interest.6 Id. The indigent status of a defendant is not
expressly enumerated by the Supreme Court as a circumstance when
prejudice will be presumed. Moreover, we note that the
recognized circumstances for presuming prejudice arise, not from
the status of the defendant, but from the state's interference
with the right to counsel and the attorney's duty of loyalty. In
deciding ineffective assistance allegations, our ultimate focus
must be the effect of counsel's conduct on the reliability of the
proceeding, not the defendant's personal characteristics.
Before applying the Strickland test to each of Parsons'
ineffective assistance claims, we note that it is not necessary
for us "to address both components of the inquiry if [he] makes
an insufficient showing on one." Strickland, 4 66 U.S. at 697;
see, e.g., Carter, 776 P.2d at 893; Bundv, 763 P.2d at 805-06.
When it is "easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the
ground of lack of sufficient prejudice," we will do so without
addressing whether counsel's performance was professionally
unreasonable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; Carter, 776 P.2d at
893; Bundv, 763 P.2d at 805-06.
1.

Failure to Object to Sworn Statements

As explained above, the prosecutor's taking sworn
statements without giving notice to the defense did not violate
Parsons' rights to counsel, to confront witnesses, or to due
process. Therefore, counsel's failure to object or to raise the
issue on appeal was not professionally unreasonable.

6

As a constitutional matter, a conflict of interest will
not give rise to a presumption of prejudice unless a defendant
shows that counsel "xactively represented conflicting interests'"
and that " x an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his
lawyer's performance.'11 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 (quoting
Cuvler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980). However, pursuant
to our "inherent supervisory power over the courts," we may
presume prejudice in circumstances where it is "unnecessary and
ill-advised to pursue a case-by-case inquiry to weigh actual
prejudice." State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 857, 859 (Utah 1992)
(while it may or may not be constitutionally impermissible,
representation of a defendant by a part-time city prosecutor is
prejudice per se).
No. 920126
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2.

Substandard Investigation

Parsons has consistently maintained that he reacted
violently to Ernest's sexual advances. He contends that this was
the "primary mitigating circumstance" and that his counsel failed
to adequately investigate the victim's homosexual tendencies.
Specifically, he argues that his counsel should have requested an
autopsy examination of the victim and used the private
investigator provided by the State. While we fail to see how
this evidence is mitigating, we will assume for purposes of
argument that it is.
Parsons cannot meet the prejudice prong of the
Strickland test simply by identifying unexplored avenues of
investigation. Rather, he must demonstrate a reasonable
probability that further investigation would have yielded
sufficient information to alter the outcome of his sentencing
hearing. Aside from Parsons' testimony, nothing in the record
indicates that the victim had homosexual inclinations. At the
penalty hearing, Mrs. Ernest emphatically testified that her late
husband had no homosexual tendencies. She stated that after
their separation, her husband began seeing two other women and
that he previously had an affair with a woman in Texas. In her
sworn statement to the prosecutor, Mrs. Ernest stated that her
husband had a girlfriend at the time she met him and that during
their marriage he associated with another attractive woman whom
he kissed and cared for very much. Bruce Opp, a friend of the
victim, testified at the penalty hearing that "homosexuality was
the farthest thing from [the victim's] mind" and that the victim
dated other women after his separation from Mrs. Ernest. The
victim's father-in-law testified that homosexuality was "very
distasteful" to Ernest and something he did not want to be a part
of. Finally, after investigation, the prosecution concluded that
"everything about the victim" indicated that he was "a completely
heterosexual family-man." In light of this overwhelming evidence
procured from Ernest's closest associates, it is unlikely that
further investigation by defense counsel would have yielded
information to the contrary.
3.

Entry of Guilty Plea

Parsons alleges two instances of ineffective assistance
concerning his guilty plea. First, he contends that counsel
advised him to plead guilty without securing any meaningful
benefit in return. Second, he asserts that the prosecution
improperly induced his guilty plea by refusing to waive the
preliminary hearing and that defense counsel failed to object to
this procedural duress or raise it on appeal.
In proving that counsel's conduct fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness, we "indulge a strong
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at
11
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689. In other words, Parsons "must overcome the presumption
that, under the circumstances, the challenged action *might be
considered sound trial strategy.'" Id. He has not overcome this
presumption.
The record indicates that the advice to plead guilty
was part of a legitimate trial strategy and was therefore
professionally reasonable. At the habeas proceeding, former
defense counsel testified that a guilty plea would blunt the
thrust of the evidence presented to the sentencing jury by not
allowing the State to emphasize and reemphasize the details of
the crime during the guilt phase. In addition, the plea would
prevent the emotional momentum of the guilt phase from pouring
over into the jury's sentencing deliberations. Counsel discussed
this strategy with Parsons in detail.
The habeas court found, and we agree, that "it was a
legitimate trial strategy to decide that it was not to Parsons'
advantage to have the same jury consider both the evidence
related to guilt or innocence . . . and then consider the
evidence related to punishment." This court "will not review
counsel's tactical decisions simply because another lawyer, e.g.,
appellate counsel, would have taken a different course." State
v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059, 1063 (Utah 1991). Likewise, whenever
there is "a legitimate exercise of professional judgment in the
choice of trial strategy, the fact that it did not produce the
expected result does not constitute ineffectiveness of counsel."
Bullock, 791 P.2d at 160; see, e.g., Tyler, 850 P.2d at 1258 (a
defendant is "not guaranteed successful assistance of counsel,"
and "competency of counsel is not measured by the result").
In addition, Parsons received benefits that were
meaningful to him in exchange for his plea, the most important of
which was the termination of the preliminary hearing. According
to the record, he had "no desire whatsoever to go through the
preliminary hearing." Defense counsel asked the prosecutor on
several occasions to waive the hearing, but the prosecutor
refused. An hour and a half into the hearing, Parsons became
"very agitated and upset" and "did not want [the hearing] to
proceed." He communicated this desire to counsel and authorized
his counsel to "just do whatever it takes to get this thing
stopped." The prosecutor testified that Parsons stood and said
in open court, "I did it, they know I did it. Why are we going
through with all of this? I want to stop this now. I don't care
what you have to do. Stop it." The proceedings recessed, and
Parsons decided to plead guilty in accordance with the trial
strategy outlined above. The record simply belies his contention
that terminating the preliminary hearing was not a meaningful
benefit to him.
Finally, Parsons argues that the prosecutor refused to
consent to waive the preliminary hearing as a means of inducing
him to enter a guilty plea and that his counsel should have
No. 920126
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objected to this tactic or insisted on Parsons' right to waive
the hearing without the prosecutor's consent. Such a course
would have been in direct conflict with rule 7 of the Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure. Rule 7 provides in part:
During the initial appearance before the
magistrate, the defendant shall be advised of
his right to a preliminary examination. If
the defendant waives his right to a
preliminary examination, and the prosecuting
attorney consents, the magistrate shall order
the defendant bound over to answer in the
district court.
Utah R. Crim. P. 7(g)(1) (emphasis added). The rule imposes no
conditions on the prosecutor's right to withhold consent.
Therefore, defense counsel's failure to object to the
prosecutor's refusing consent was not ineffective assistance.
Furthermore, Parsons has failed to show the requisite
prejudice. Where a defendant challenges a guilty plea on grounds
of ineffective assistance of counsel, he or she must show "a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he [or
she] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on
going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). In
other words, counsel's deficient performance must have "affected
the outcome of the plea process." Id. There is no evidence in
the record that Parsons ever intended to go to trial. On the
contrary, he consistently maintained his guilt, admitting in open
court at the preliminary hearing that he killed the victim.
Likewise, he has not sought to withdraw his guilty plea but
argues only to have his sentence vacated. Because he has never
desired to go to trial, we cannot conclude that he was prejudiced
by counsel's advice to plead guilty.
4.

Juror-Witness Contact

During the penalty hearing, a juror conversed briefly
with a prosecution witness. Parsons contends that his counsel's
failure to interrogate both the juror and the witness and to
preserve the issue for direct appeal constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel. We disagree.
Parsons raised this issue on direct appeal, arguing
that the juror-witness contact tainted the jury. We dismissed
this argument, refusing to allow Parsons to "vacate his sentence
by alleging on appeal prejudicial error" that he had
"affirmatively, knowingly, and intentionally waived at the
sentencing proceeding." State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1285
(Utah 1989). More importantly, however, we concluded that
"[e]ven analyzing the facts under the standards provided in State
v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 279-81 (Utah 1985), we could find no
error." Id. (emphasis added). Because no error resulted from
13
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the juror's contact with the prosecution witness, counsel's
failure to interrogate the witness cannot be deemed ineffective
assistance. Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1109 (Utah 1983)
("The failure of counsel to make motions or objections which
would be futile if raised does not constitute ineffective
assistance.").
5.

Failure to File Discovery Request

Parsons next contends that his counsel's failure to
move for formal discovery was ineffective assistance. Rule 16 of
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the prosecutor
shall disclose "to the defense upon request" certain "material or
information of which he has knowledge." Utah R. Crim. P.
16(a)(l)-(5). The "request" contemplated in rule 16 is a written
request for discovery filed at least five days prior to trial as
provided for in rule 12. Utah R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3); State v.
Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 346 (Utah 1985). Rule 16, however,
provides for informal discovery "when convenience reasonably
requires." Utah R. Crim. P. 16(e). Informal discovery permits
the prosecutor or defense to "make disclosure by notifying the
opposing party that material and information may be inspected,
tested or copied at specified reasonable times and places." Id.
The discovery in this case was informal. The
prosecutor had an "open file policy" pursuant to which all
evidence and documents were "given to the defense, simultaneously
with [the prosecutor's] receiving it." At the habeas proceeding,
the prosecutor testified that "everything [he] had was given to
[defense counsel] and Mr. Parsons from day one." Likewise,
defense counsel testified that the State did not use any evidence
at trial that he had not seen before.
To prove prejudice, Parsons must show that filing a
formal discovery motion would have yielded exculpatory
information that the "open file policy" did not yield. He has
not done so. Admittedly, a defendant who does not file a written
request for discovery under rule 12 qannot on appeal assign error
to the failure of the prosecutor to disclose the "material or
information" described in rule 16(a)(1) to (5). Booker. 709 P.2d
at 346. However, Parsons has not proffered any evidence that
such undisclosed material or information existed. Speculation
that it exists is not sufficient to meet the prejudice component
of the Strickland test. Fernandez v. Cook,
P.2d
,
(Utah 1993) ("On many occasions, this court has reiterated that
proof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a
speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality.").
6.

Inadequate Trial Preparation

Parsons contends that counsel spent inadequate time
with him in preparing for the sentencing hearing. At the habeas
proceeding, he testified that counsel spent only between four and
No. 920126
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five hours with him. Former defense counsel, on the other hand,
testified that he spent about twenty hours with Parsons. Parsons
argues that it is ineffective per se for counsel in a homicide
case to meet with the defendant for between four and twenty
hours.
We decline to determine what amount of time counsel
must spend with a defendant to ensure that the representation
does not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.
Clearly, the time period will vary with every case. Rather, we
dismiss Parsons' argument because he has not shown prejudice. He
has not proffered any evidence that counsel overlooked
information critical to the defense as a result of spending too
little time with him in preparation. In the absence of this
evidence, we cannot find that the outcome of the sentencing
hearing would have been different if defense counsel had spent
more time with Parsons.
7.

Failure to Conduct Adequate Voir Dire

Parsons argues that his counsel failed to conduct
adequate voir dire. Specifically, he claims that while counsel
asked the jurors whether they had heard or read anything about
the case, he failed to ask them what they had heard or read.
Thus, counsel did not create a record from which an appellate
court could determine whether juror exposure to the media
resulted in prejudice.
According to the record, the court asked the jurors
whether and from what source they had heard or read anything
about the case and whether they had formed an opinion as to the
appropriate outcome. Three jurors had not been exposed to any
media reports on the case. Seven had read articles in The
Spectrumf the local newspaper. Of these seven, one had also
heard radio reports and another had read an article in the
Deseret News. Of the two remaining jurors, one had heard a
television report, and the other, a radio report.
The court also asked whether the jurors could set aside
any outside information and base their decision on the evidence
presented in court. Each juror answered affirmatively. Finally,
the court asked the jurors whether they as defendants would be
willing to be tried by twelve persons just like themselves in
light of their preexisting knowledge of the case. Each juror
responded affirmatively.
Parsons has not demonstrated that further inquiry into
each juror's exposure to media reports would have altered the
outcome of his sentencing hearing. The media coverage to which
five jurors had been exposed was limited to a single local
newspaper. The juror who had heard a television report had
little memory of it, and three jurors had not heard or read
anything at all. Parsons has not produced any evidence that the
15
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content of The Spectrum's articles, the radio reports, and the
television coverage predisposed the jurors to impose the death
penalty. Thus, he has failed to show a reasonable probability
that the outcome of his sentencing hearing would have been
different but for counsel's failure to further inquire into the
content of the media coverage to which the venire had been
exposed.
8.

The Special Verdict Form

On direct appeal, Parsons argued that the court "misled
the jury by giving special verdict instructions and questions on
aggravating circumstances while only generally instructing on
mitigating circumstances." Parsons, 781 P.2d at 1279. He
contended that the effect of the special verdict form was to
mislead the jury so that it could find "only aggravating
circumstances and no mitigating circumstances in determining his
sentence." Id. He further argued that special verdict forms
should be forbidden in capital sentencing proceedings or that
courts should be required to give special verdict instructions on
both aggravating and mitigating factors. Id. We rejected this
argument, holding that giving special verdict questions on
aggravating factors but not mitigating factors did not mislead
the jury.
In the habeas proceeding, Parsons attacked the special
verdict form a second time. The form contained three questions.
The first asked whether the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant committed the murder in the course of an
aggravated robbery. The second asked whether the jury found
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally killed
the victim for pecuniary gain. The final question asked whether
the jury similarly found that the defendant, "being a person on
parole, knowingly possessed or had in his custody or under his
control a firearm."
Parsons first argues that including the third question
on the special verdict form—whether the jury could find beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant, "being a person on parole,
knowingly possessed or had in his custody or under his control a
firearm"—was error because a parolee's possession of a firearm
is not an aggravating factor enumerated in section 76-5-202.
This fact, however, is immaterial and could not have prejudiced
Parsons. In the penalty phase, the sentencer may consider any
relevant facts in aggravation or mitigation of the penalty. See
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(2). Inclusion in section 76-5-202 is
not a prerequisite for consideration by the sentencing body.
Parsons also contends that in addition to the three
questions outlined above, the special verdict form should have
asked the jury whether it could find beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant, having been previously convicted of a felony
involving the use or threat of violence to another person,
No. 920126
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intentionally or knowingly caused the death of another. He
argues that omitting this aggravating factor "gave the jury an
opportunity to find a cause for imposing the death penalty
without recording any vote on the special verdict form.11
According to Parsons, counsel,s failure to object on this ground
constituted ineffective assistance. We disagree. Parsons'
previous commission of a felony involving the use or threat of
violence to another was the aggravating factor in section
76-5-202 that elevated his crime from second to first degree
murder. It was this aggravating factor to which he pleaded
guilty. Therefore, including it on the special verdict form
would have been a superfluous formality, not an outcome-altering
error.
Finally, Parsons contends that because an element of
the crime of robbery is the "taking of personal property in the
possession of another," then that crime will always be committed
for pecuniary or other personal gain. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301.
Section 76-5-202 of the Utah Code lists, among many others, the
following two aggravating factors to be considered by the court
or jury at sentencing:
(d) The homicide was committed while
the actor was engaged in the commission of,
or an attempt to commit, or flight after
committing or attempting to commit,
aggravated robbery, robbery . . . .
(f) The homicide was committed for
pecuniary or other personal gain.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1) (Supp. 1993). The special verdict
form in this case listed both as potential aggravating factors.
Parsons contends that the resulting effect of the special verdict
form was to "split the single act of robbery into two potential
|^ aggravating circumstances . . . when only one should have been
/ presented for consideration." According to Parsons, this
'
"double-counting" misled the jury to impose the sentence of death
and should have been objected to by counsel.
J/
In Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 246 (1988), the
[yV United States Supreme Court held that the aggravating
/ circumstance used in the sentencing phase of a trial can
duplicate an element of the underlying offense without violating
the Eighth Amendment of the federal constitution. Under the Utah
sentencing scheme this type of double-counting occurs. Section
76-5-202 of the Utah Code enumerates several aggravating elements
that elevate a homicide from second to first degree or aggravated
murder. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(a)-(q) (Supp. 1993).
Section 76-3-207 permits the sentencing jury to consider these
same elements as aggravating factors during the penalty phase of
a trial. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(3) (Supp. 1993). Like the
United States Supreme Court, we have held that counting a single
17
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aggravating circumstance in both the guilt and the penalty phase
of a trial does not render Utah / s sentencing scheme
unconstitutional. State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 460 n.65 (Utah
1988).
However, Parsons raises a different kind of "doublecounting." He contends that including both the robbery-murder
factor and the pecuniary-gain factor on the special verdict form
unfairly divided a single act of the defendant, aggravated
robbery, into two aggravating factors. This double-counting
differs from that declared constitutional in Lowenfield and
Bishop. Here, the double-counting occurs solely in the penalty
phase of the trial and involves, not the double-counting of a
single aggravating factor, but the double-counting of a single
act of the defendant.
In failing to object to the special verdict form on
these grounds, counsel's performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness. The Supreme Court has held that the
discretion of sentencing juries must be "suitably directed and
limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and
capricious action." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976).
To achieve this channeled discretion, each aggravating factor
"must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the
death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a
more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found
guilty of murder." Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983).
When considered together in aggravation, the robberymurder factor and the pecuniary-gain factor do not narrow the
class of defendants eligible for the death penalty. One element
of the crime of robbery is the "taking of personal property in
the possession of another."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301(1).
Thus, robbery inherently comprises an attempt to gain
pecuniarily. It is nonsensical to say that a defendant who
commits a homicide during the commission of a robbery is somehow
more deserving of the death penalty because he also committed the
murder for pecuniary gain.
In addition, under the present scheme, defendants who
commit a homicide in the course of a robbery will always begin
the sentencing hearing with two aggravating factors against them
for no other reason than that the underlying felony was robbery.
Engberg v. Meyer. 820 P.2d 70, 89 (Wyo. 1991); Provence v. State,
337 So. 2d 783, 786 (Fla.), cert, denied, 431 U.S. 969 (1976).
Defendants who commit a homicide in the course of any other
enumerated felony are not similarly disadvantaged. T^jg I'SL.
inherently unfair. In the words of the Mississippi Supreme
Court, "When life is at stake, a jury cannot be allowed the
opportunity to doubly weigh the commission of the underlying
felony and the motive behind [the] underlying felony as separate
aggravators." Willie v. State, 585 So. 2d 660, 681 (Miss. 1991);
see Cook v. State, 369 So. 2d 1251, 1256-57 (Ala. 1979); People
No. 920126
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v. Mickey, 286 Cal. Rptr. 801, 835 (Cal. 1991) (modifying People
v, Bicrelow, 37 Cal. 3d 731, 691 P.2d 994, 209 Cal. Rptr. 328
(1984)); Provence, 337 So. 2d at 786; State v. Rust. 250 N.W.2d
867, 873-74 (Neb.), cert, denied. 434 U.S. 912 (1977); Engberg,
820 P.2d at 89.
For these reasons, in the future, jury instructions or
special vercict forms which contain either of the two murderrobbery factors in section 76-5-202(1)(d) should not contain the
pecuniary-gain factor as well. Otherwise, a defendant is
essentially condemned "twice for the same culpable act." Cook,
369 So. 2d at 1256. As a general rule, courts should construe
the aggravating factors in section 76-5-202 so as to "minimize
those cases in which multiple circumstances will apply to the
same conduct, thereby reducing the risk that multiple findings on
[aggravating] . . . circumstances will prejudice the
defendant."7 People v. Biqelow, 37 Cal. 3d 731, 691 P.2d 994,
1006, 209 Cal. Rptr. 328 (1984). If the aggravating factors in
section 76-5-202 are to "genuinely narrow the class of persons

7

As worded, section 76-5-202 arguably creates this risk. A
careful reading reveals that multiple aggravating factors may
frequently apply to the same conduct of a defendant under
subpart (d). For example, a person commits aggravated kidnapping
when he or she "intentionally or knowingly, without authority of
law and against the will of the victim, . . . detains or
transports the victim with intent to hold for ransom." Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-302. If the perpetrator kills the victim in the
process, section 76-5-202 arguably splits the single act of
aggravated kidnapping into two aggravating factors—aggravated
kidnapping under subpart (d) and pecuniary gain under
subpart (f) . Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (1) (d) , (f) .
Likewise, a person is guilty of aggravated arson if "by
means of fire or explosives he [or she] intentionally and
unlawfully damages any structure or vehicle when any person not a
participant in the offense is in the structure or vehicle." Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-103(1). If two persons are in the structure but
only one dies, the single act of aggravated arson may give rise
to two aggravating factors in section 76-5-202: The homicide
occurred in the course of aggravated arson and "created a great
risk of death to a person other than the victim." Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-202(1) (c), (d) .
Further, section 76-5-202 now provides that aggravated
murder, formerly "first degree murder," occurs when the
"defendant committed . . . the homicide pursuant to an agreement
or contract for remuneration." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(g)
(Supp. 1993) . Where the defendant contracts for monetary
remuneration in exchange for the killing, that single act may
implicate both the pecuniary-gain factor under subsection (f) and
the contract- or agreement-for-remuneration factor under
subsection (g) . Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (f), (g) (Supp. 1993).
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eligible for the death penalty," this rule of construction must
be applied. Zant, 462 U.S. at 877.
However, turning to the prejudice prong of the
Strickland test, we do not find a reasonable probability that if
counsel had objected to the double-counting described above, the
sentencing jury would have concluded that "the balance of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death."
Strickland. 466 U.S. at 695. The jury was instructed
sufficiently to cure any prejudice that may have resulted from
the improper double-counting on the special verdict form.
The court instructed the jury to answer the special
verdict questions "prior to entering [its] verdict" and as an
"aid in [its] deliberations." Further, the court instructed the
jury that H[i]f the final vote of the jury members is xNo' or
less than a unanimous *Yes' as to any special verdict question,
then you may not consider the elements of that individual
question as aggravating circumstances." By requiring a
"unanimous determination on each of three aggravating factors
before they could be weighed against the mitigating factors," the
special verdict form operated as a "safeguard" to Parsons. State
v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1280 (Utah 1989).
In addition, the court specifically instructed the jury
that it must weigh the totality of the mitigating factors against
the totality of the aggravating factors, "not in terms of the
relative numbers of the aggravating and mitigating factors, but
in terms of their respective substantiality and persuasiveness"
(emphasis added). This instruction is in "meticulous compliance"
with the standards we set forth in State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71,
83-85 (Utah), cert, denied. 459 U.S. 988 (1982); Parsons, 781
P.2d at 1280.
In deciding whether Parsons was prejudiced, we must
conclude that the jury did as it was instructed to do. No
defendant is entitled "to the luck of a lawless decision-maker."
Stricklandf 4 66 U.S. at 695. Therefore, our assessment of
prejudice proceeds "on the assumption that the decision maker is
reasonably, conscientiously, and impartially applying the
standards that govern the decision." Id. Because the jury did
not consider any aggravating factor without first finding that it
existed beyond a reasonable doubt and because the jury weighed
the persuasiveness, not the number, of aggravating factors, we
cannot find that eliminating the pecuniary-gain question from the
special verdict form would have changed the outcome of Parsons'
hearing.
CUMULATIVE ERROR
Because Parsons has failed to establish any errors of
counsel that prejudiced his right to a fair trial, the doctrine
of cumulative error does not apply. Bundy v. DeLand, 763 P.2d
No. 920126
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803, 806 (Utah 1988) (citing State v, Ellis, 748 P.2d 188, 191
(Utah 1987)); State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 501-02 (Utah 1986).
RIGHT TO STATE-COMPENSATED COUNSEL IN HABEAS PROCEEDINGS
In his habeas proceeding, Parsons argued that under the
federal and state constitutions, defendants pursuing habeas
relief for the first time were entitled to counsel compensated by
the state. The United States Supreme Court has held that neither
the Due Process Clause nor the equal protection guarantee of
meaningful access requires a state to provide counsel for
indigent defendants seeking postconviction relief. Pennsylvania
v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555-56 (1987) (citing Ross v. Moffit,
417 U.S. 600, 610-11 (1974)). This rule applies with equal force
to defendants convicted of capital crimes. Murray v. Giarratano,
492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989).
We decline to address and decide in this proceeding
whether under the Utah Constitution appointed counsel in a first
habeas proceeding has a right to be compensated by the state.
The district court opined that it was an issue which should be
resolved legislatively. If that course is not to be followed and
the question is to be resolved by the judiciary because of its
far-reaching impact, it should be addressed in a proceeding where
all affected parties, organizations, agencies, and entities are
invited to participate in the briefing and oral argument, not
limited to the parties of a single case such as we now have
before us.
In denying compensation to appointed counsel, we are
not unmindful of the generous contribution of their time and
resources to this case. We thank them for the high quality of
their professional effort in behalf of Parsons.
The denial of the writ is affirmed.

WE CONCUR:

I. Daniel Stewart, Associate
Chief Justice

Gordon R. Hall, Justice
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ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice, concurring:
I concur in Justice Howe's opinion. However, I write
to note that we continue to sidestep an issue that cannot be
ignored much longer, i.e., whether those who have been convicted
of a crime but cannot afford a lawyer should have a right to paid
counsel in connection with their initial postconviction
proceeding.
The traditional view on this issue, epitomized by the
United States Supreme Court decisions cited by Justice Howe,.is,
founded on a number of fictions. Among them are the following:
the assertion m a t postconviction proceedings are "civil" and not
an integral part of the usual criminal prosecution; the refusal
to acknowledge that a number of legal doctrines, most notably the
ineffectiveness of counsel rulings by the United States Supreme
Court, have virtually mandated at least one postconviction
evidentiary hearing and subsequent appeal before even the most
diligent defendant's legal remedies are exhausted; and the legal
fiction, indeed deliberate fantasy, that these extraordinary,
complex legal doctrines and the associated postconviction
proceedings can be handled competently by an unrepresented
indigent defendant.
Much of the successive postconviction writ practice
that currently incites public wrath against the criminal justice
system can be traced directly to the fact that the system
persists in refusing to assure that a defendant has adequate
counsel in the initial postconviction proceeding. In the face of
this fact, it is hardly surprising that the courts remain
reluctant to shut the courthouse doors on defendants who have
never had a fair opportunity to fully litigate their claim to
rights bestowed upon them by the federal and state constitutions.
See, e.g., Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547 (Utah 1989) (holding
that ineffectiveness-of-counsel claim can be raised for first
time in postconviction proceeding when trial counsel handled
initial appeal from conviction).
The public, the judiciary, and even the prosecutorial
agencies would be better served if we took our collective heads
out of the sand and acted to ensure free counsel to indigent
defendants for one omnibus postconviction proceeding. Today may
not be the day, nor this the case, on which to address the
constitutional questions raised by the current state of affairs.
But the time draws nigh when we will be unable to continue
avoiding reality in the name of outworn legal fictions. I
acknowledge that there may be a number of unspoken administrative
and financial considerations that support the present state of
affairs. But none of them can withstand scrutiny if the
"criminal justice" system is to be worthy of its name. See

No. 920126

22

Gerrish v. Barnes, 844 P.2d 315, 321 (Utah 1991) (Zimmerman, J.,
concurring).x
Durham, Justice, concurs in the concurring opinion of
Chief Justice Zimmerman.
Hall, Justice, acted on this case prior to his
retirement.

1

There are recent indications that the Utah Bar in general
may be taking note of problems with the present system that
criminal lawyers have known about for a long time. See Randy L.
Dryer, Habeas Corpus Practice In Utah—A Franz Kafka Mind
Boggier?, Utah Bar J., May 1993, at 4.
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ADDENDUM II

MOTION AND ORDER FOR ADDITIONAL
TIME TO FILE
PETITION FOR REHEARING

FILED
JAN 2 5 1994
CLERK SUPREME COURT
UTAH

ORIGINAL

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JOSEPH MITCHELL PARSONS,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

MOTION FOR ADDITIONAL TIME
TO FILE PETITION FOR
REHEARING

M. ELDON BARNES,

Appeal No. 920126

Defendant/Appellee.

Plaintiff/Appellant Joseph Mitchell Parsons, pursuant to
Rule 22(c) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, hereby moves this
Court for an additional fourteen (14) days within which to file a
Petition for Rehearing.
This motion is premised on the fact that counsel for
plaintiff/appellant is reviewing the opinion for potential issues
for resolution by the Court on rehearing.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

2$

day of January, 1994.

4^Uw

RONALD J. YENGICH,/ #3^0
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
175 East 400 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-0320

GREGORY/^' SAffDERS

/

KIPP 6 CHRISTIAN
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
175 East 400 South, Suite 330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3773
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby declare that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Motion for Additional Time to File Petition for
Rehearing, postage prepaid, this f*l y^ day of January, 1994, to
Kris Leonard, Assistant Attorney General, 236 State Capitol, Salt
Lake City, Utah, 84114.
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FILED
JAN 2 5 1994
CLERK SUPREME COURT
UTAH

ORIGINAL

IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OF UTAH
JOSEPH MITCHELL PARSONS,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

ORDER GRANTING ADDITIONAL
TIME TO FILE PETITION FOR
REHEARING
Appeal No. 920126

M. ELDON BARNES,
Defendant/Appellee.

Based upon the motion of plaintiff/appellant

Joseph

Mitchell Parsons, and for good cause shown,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff/appellant Joseph
Mitchell Parsons be granted an additional fourteen (14) days within
which to file a Petition for Rehearing.
SIGNED BY MY HAND this $ ** day of January, 1094.

BY THE COURT:

i
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•^
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UTAH SUPREME COURT JUSTICE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby declare that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing proposed Order Granting Additional Time to File
Petition for Rehearing, postage prepaid, this A S"" day of January,
1994, to Kris Leonard, Assistant Attorney General, 236 State
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114.
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